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BOEING'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEMS RESTRUCTURING: SIGNIFICANT AND PREVENTABLE COST IMPACTS TO ARMY AVIATION PROGRAMS
The continued erosion of the United States' defense industrial base portends significant detrimental effects for many Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system programs. Since the heady days of the Cold War, defense industrial capability and capacity have been sharply declining while DoD's weapon system procurement costs have been steadily rising. This especially holds true when considering the contributions of private industry. However, the Government's "organic" depot capabilities (i.e. for weapon system maintenance, repair and rebuild) have also significantly atrophied during this same time-frame. The causes for this decline are many and multi-faceted.
There now remain only a handful of companies significantly engaged in the defense aerospace marketplace. However, within this diminishing environment, defense contractors continue to gain in both prestige and power. With defense work comprising an ever-smaller portion of the business base, Government leverage with these materiel providers is increasingly reduced. Recent experience has witnessed defense contractors executing "efficiency-seeking" operational decisions with significant detrimental effects for Army programs. While many of these decisions remain beyond the Government's span of control, a sub-set is well within the purview of U.S. defense officials and policy-makers to directly affect. Since a robust defense industrial foundation, favorable to domestic defense interests, is essential for the current and future security of our nation, it falls to defense leaders at all levels to employ effective measures to address this situation when and where possible. In some instances we are falling well short of this goal.
Within this paper, I will explore the reasons for this phenomenon, scope the depth/breadth of the issue and use as a case study the CH-47F/G (Chinook) and the AH-64A/D (Apache) helicopter programs; weapon systems designed, developed, fielded, and supported by The 
BACKGROUND
It is doubtful that the euphoria associated with the end of the Cold War was universally shared in the corporate boardrooms of America. War is usually good for business and this particular war was certainly no exception. For an uninterrupted period of 45 years, America's most prominent weapon system builders had operated in an environment without precedent. In 1989, all of this came to an abrupt end. As the Berlin Wall was knocked from its foundation and smashed into shards suitable for sale to tourists, it is not hard to imagine what may have been occurring at many defense-related manufacturing concerns. Board meetings would be called and a pointed question posed to all present; simply…"What now?" The answer would be determined to be elusive, quite complex, and arguably, is still being worked through some 15 years later.
For most weapon system purveyors, the slow-down in the level of effort was near immediate. Many, if not most, weapon system design, development, and manufacturing efforts were at that time pursued via one-year cost or fixed-price type contracts. Within the context of declining requirements, this feature allowed unilateral Government re-structuring of the work without the significant cost and delays associated with "work terminations" for the convenience of the Government. 1 They bluntly informed the group that DoD would no longer procure the number of weapon systems that had enabled them to prosper during the Cold War and especially during the latter years of the Reagan build-up.
They predicted that within five years, 50% of the companies represented at the meeting would no longer be in business. While they did not explicitly lay out strategy, Aspin and Perry did encourage mergers and acquisitions where appropriate and indicated overall DoD acceptance and support for this approach.
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As recent history has shown, this candid meeting between Government and industry power-brokers was a seminal event. In its aftermath, a series of corporate mergers and acquisitions transformed the defense industry landscape, as companies moved to capture work, consolidate advantage, and acquire desired capability. In a few short years, the field of major defense contractors had been significantly reduced. Within the defense aerospace industry, some 40 companies, in whole or in part, were reduced to just three; Boeing, Lockheed, and Raytheon. 3 Within the sub-set of defense's industry's rotary-wing sector, the story was much the same. In 1997, Raytheon merged with the defense business unit of Texas Instruments and acquired Hughes Aircraft (i.e. the original designer/builder of the AH-64A Apache helicopter).
In that same year, Boeing wholly acquired McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company (MDAC), retaining, among other things, the (now) MDAC AH-64A/D Apache helicopter line, while divesting the MD Helicopter Inc.'s 500 series light helicopter line. 4 As the remaining defense industry players maneuvered to divide the much-reduced workload, a less overt and more far-reaching force was beginning to encroach upon the defense business environment. The unfettered opening of the market place, somewhat stymied by the bi-polar world of the previous four (+) decades, and now greatly facilitated by increasingly sophisticated information technologies, was fully unleashed. The impacts of the globalization of the marketplace upon the U.S. defense industry in general were not immediately recognized. The primary issue with the above modifications resided within the causal-beneficial relationship between a site's overhead costs, the costs' aggregation and their subsequent allocation to programs. Under the previous A&M and S&C construct, site overhead costs were collected and subsequently allocated directly to the programs with which they were associated.
For example, those overhead costs generated at Boeing Mesa where the AH-64A/D Apache work was conducted were allocated primarily to the Apache program. The general idea being that the program(s) responsible for the generation of the costs (i.e. those that received the benefit), should be the same program(s) which subsequently pay the bill (i.e. are allocated the costs). Under the IDS construct of over-arching co-mingling, aggregation, and subsequent reallocation of multiple-site overhead costs, this would no longer be the process. Under the IDS G&A cost pooling construct, overhead costs generated by the 28 disparate sites would be aggregated (i.e. pooled) and subsequently re-allocated across the IDS organization.
Considering the differing levels of site-specific contributions to these cost pools and the subsequent "peanut butter spread" apportionment of these costs across the organization, the inequities associated with this cost treatment approach were immediately apparent. Most troublesome was that the highly efficient sites associated with Army work (i.e. Philadelphia and Mesa) would thus be "taxed" for the inefficiencies of other sites. Several of the former S&C sites associated with USAF programs in California were particularly noteworthy for their inefficiencies and high site-specific G&A expense levels.
In a perfect world where all sites experienced the (exact) same level of associated overhead costs, this would not have been problematic. Reality is that overhead costs vary remarkably from place to place (i.e. program to program) and a "leveling" or "peanut butter spread" of cost allocations (with no detrimental effects to all programs) is simply not possible.
As Boeing applied the cost structure changes associated with IDS, the program impacts at the Army level were instantly evident and quite significant.
Within the G&A data provided by Boeing for the Government review, it was immediately apparent that the former A&M sites were getting the short end of the IDS stick. Within the G&A sub-categories of Bid and Proposal costs, the former A&M sites, including Philadelphia and Mesa, accounted for only 38% of the costs, yet post-IDS would be allocated a full 50%. Within the Business Development sub-category of G&A costs, former A&M sites would similarly receive a 50% cost allocation, yet they were responsible for only 47% of the actual costs. All told, the G&A expense of the former A&M sites would rise from 12.9% to 14% (a 1.1% increase), while former S&C sites would realize net decreases of approximately 1%.
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Even at first glance, the IDS restructure created clear "winners" and "losers" at the Service/program level. Whereas Army programs at Mesa (i.e. Apache) and Philadelphia (i.e.
Chinook and at that time Comanche) would absorb expense and realize programmatic cost increases, other Service/agency programs (e.g. launch and satellite, missile defense systems)
would directly benefit and realize net cost decreases.
14 Unfortunately, the G&A recompilation was just one area of the IDS restructuring that was unfavorable to Army programs. Under IDS, the treatment and handling of Boeing World
Headquarters (BWHQ) costs, common or shared systems costs, Shared Services Group costs, fringe benefit costs (including pensions and medical retirement expense), and program support costs would be greatly altered. To a large degree, most of these costs were "new" costs to former A&M sites; and directly associated with IDS-driven changes in the accounting, aggregation, and finally, allocation of these expenses. 15 One such example is the addition of the Shared Services Group (SSG) expense to the Mesa and Philadelphia accounting ledgers. Under the IDS construct, the SSG provided (for a fee of course), a centralized, off-site administrative services capability (e.g. printing, copying, facility maintenance, etc.) Prior to, and even after the implementation of IDS, the Mesa and Philadelphia site managers chose to maintain their own, very low cost organic capability to handle such service requirements. Apparently, on-site responsiveness was determined to merit the small additional expense, and so, where there was once efficiency, there was now redundancy and additional cost. For the three year CY '03-'05 timeframe depicted in Table 1 ., the $32M IDS-related impacts to the Apache program were attributable to the following sub-categories of cost increases.
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• Home Office Allocations: $5.4M
• Common/Shared Systems: $6.1M
• Fringe Benefits: $9.9M
• Business/Program Support: $4.5M
• IDS G&A Increase: $6.1M 
IDS-RELATED COST INCREASE PROJECTIONS (CYS '06-'08)
The further breakdown of cost projections for these subsequent years is remarkably similar (in percentages) to the CY '03 -'05 timeframe and thus further depiction is unnecessary.
Suffice it to say that the premise of negligible programmatic cost impact associated with the IDS restructuring simply did not hold up under closer scrutiny. Army programs at Philadelphia and Mesa would certainly feel the pain of the IDS restructure and the impacts would be in the tens of millions of dollars.
INFORMING THE CUSTOMER OF PENDING COST IMPACTS
Resident DCMA commanders at Philadelphia and Mesa ensured that the affected customers were immediately notified of the projected IDS-driven cost impacts to their programs. impacts, and the exploration of agreed-to cost increase thresholds, enforceable through contractual mechanisms. 24 However, beyond these initiatives, no further action was taken by the Government. In the final analysis, Boeing's IDS restructuring was considered to be a reasonable action undertaken by a rational, profit-seeking business entity. The thought was that as long as the IDS-related accounting changes were in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), there was little the Government could do.
In reality however, there were options available to the Government in this instance. One such alternative, discussed very early in the process but set aside, was the application of the cost accounting standards associated with the efforts in Philadelphia and Mesa. Enforcement of these standards could have proven an effective means of exercising leverage over the uncooperative contractor; a contractor intent on making accounting changes, favorable to the company bottom line but clearly detrimental to Government interests.
COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS HAVE RELEVANCE AND VALUE
Cost accounting standards (CAS) are an outgrowth of Government concern over the pricing and accounting practices employed by defense contractors. The twenty cost accounting standards (i.e. CAS 401 -420) address three primary areas of concern: 1) Measurement of cost, 2) Assignment of cost to a cost accounting period, and 3)
Allocation of cost to cost objectives. 29 The CAS most applicable to the Boeing IDS decision directly relate to the third area of concern, the allocation of cost to cost objectives. Specifically, CAS 403 concerns the allocation of home office expenses to business segments, CAS 418 addresses the allocation of direct and indirect costs in general, and CAS 420 focuses upon accounting treatment for Independent Research and Development (IRAD) bid and proposal costs.
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Compliance with CAS (in total) is mandatory for contractual efforts requiring "disclosure and consistency in accounting practices." 31 The Army programs at Philadelphia and Mesa are subject to "full disclosure" and therefore must adhere to full compliance with all CAS. Remedies for non-compliance are usually exercised by the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) through the required submission, review and approval of the contractor Disclosure Statement.
This document is a complete description of the company's cost accounting practices and procedures. The Disclosure Statement is used by DCAA as a measure of the contractor's consistency and compliance in routine application of accounting practices with regard to applicable CAS. 32 Disclosure Statements must pass two litmus tests, one for adequacy (i.e. the statement adequately describes the company's accounting practices), the other for compliance (i.e. the accounting practices as described are fully compliant with applicable CAS). Failure within either area is typically discovered and reported by DCAA during routine audit. The auditor is responsible to report either the inadequacy and/or non-compliance to the DCMA ACO, who makes the final determination. Disclosure Statement inadequacies are usually addressed by requiring the contractor to submit a revised statement. Upon determination that the statement is current, accurate, and complete, it is accepted upon the basis of adequacy. A finding of noncompliance is typically more involved (and emotional) for all parties. Non-compliance connotes either non-compliance with a specific standard or that the contractor is not consistently following its own disclosed practices. 33 After the initial issuance of a finding on non-compliance (i.e. by the ACO), the contractor has 60 days to submit a description of the accounting changes required for compliance, a description of the potential impacts of the changes, and an estimate of the cost of the change(s). 34 If the contractor disagrees with the ACO's finding, it has 60 days to present a rebuttal argument and supporting evidence. After a review of all information, the ACO issues a final determination of compliance or non-compliance; in the event of non-compliance, the contractor then has 60 days to submit a cost impact for each CAS-covered contract, from the date of failure to comply. If the ACO determines the cost impact to be material, he remedies the infraction by effecting a price adjustment to the effort via a contract modification. 35 Arguably, this is the process that the Government could have followed when Boeing initially proposed the accounting changes associated with the IDS restructure. The reason why this line of pursuit was discarded early in the process is not apparent. At the Philadelphia and Mesa facilities, a solid basis for non-compliance was evident. The information provided in Table   3 , clearly and overwhelmingly supports this premise. • Re-invigorate the Government's use of prescriptive standards, like the cost accounting standards, where/when necessary. As application/enforcement of CAS has become somewhat of a lost art, this will require wholesale immersion/retraining of appropriate Government personnel in their structure, effective application, and utility. Procuring contracting officers, auditors, and administrative contracting officers should be/become well-versed and adept in the nuances of the standards and how (and when) they should be brought to bear. Educated, well reasoned application and enforcement of these standards will deter defense contractors from making coststructure decisions that may be GAAP compliant, yet in direct contravention to Government interests. Reinvigoration of CAS, in a time when many pundits are calling for their total elimination, would hold defense contractors responsible for selfinduced cost increases to Service programs. In this situation, if a contractor saw the need to re-organize to enhance efficiencies, he could do so as long as the company was willing to bear any additional costs associated with that reorganization. The standards, as they currently exist, are more than adequate to address/prevent most instances of contractor malfeasance. Paramount is that the Government becomes (more) comfortable with their routine, appropriate application, regardless of contractor protestations.
• Have DCAA/DCMA provide the PMOs with accounting/costing system type training/professional development on a periodic basis. This could be accomplished within existing budgetary constraints, be informal, yet very informative in nature. One approach would be for DCAA/DCMA to provide this training in conjunction with a weapon system's periodic progress review (PPR), usually held at the prime contractor's facility. These (typically quarterly) reviews bring the major players together from both Government and contractor organizations. A few hours of focused training to key PMO personnel, provided by an experienced DCAA auditor, would significantly raise the current level of knowledge in this critical area. Currently, PMOs tend to regard changes to accounting systems as outside their lane, the sole responsibility of DCAA/DCMA for surveillance and action, when warranted. This is a mistake, a viewpoint which hampers the Government's ability to discourage aberrant accounting approaches early in the acquisition process. Through this proposed periodic emphasis/training, an inter-agency/Service teaming relationship will be fostered. In this scenario, a contractor considering and/or proposing unfavorable cost accounting modifications will most certainly encounter a knowledgeable, coherent, unified, Government viewpoint/position.
• 
CONCLUSION
The relationship between defense contractors and the DoD is today at a critical juncture. Druyun admitted to improperly favoring Boeing for several high-value procurement contracts that she was responsible for while in Government service. Mr. Michael Sears, Boeing's recently fired CFO, plead guilty for his complicity in Ms. Druyun's conflict-of-interest tinged decisions.
As of this writing, there is a growing, corroborated concern that Boeing and similar defenserelated conglomerates may be unwilling (or unable) to effectively police their ranks. Because of Boeing's current legal/ethical challenges, many are now questioning whether the company is a good fit for the role of lead system integrator for the Army's Future Combat System, a $100B
program. 41 Clearly, the DoD will not be able to call all the shots, all of the time. Furthermore, this treatise does not suggest that aggressive, effective Government oversight is a panacea, enabling prevention of all instances and types of fraud, abuse, and otherwise unfavorable corporate decision-making. This examination is far more limited in scope and suggests only that there are scenarios in which the DoD retains much power and leverage. In many instances, laws exist, regulations are in place, and standards (including cost accounting standards) are called out in contractual documents. These levers need only be effectively employed by knowledgeable, capable Government overseers.
The only remaining decision is when and where to bring these capabilities to bear. There is a school of thought among senior federal employees which postulates that the DoD has lost its will and ability to successfully prosecute these opportunities. If this is true, then time is of the essence. We must immediately educate and retool our defense workforce, making our people fully aware, and capable of employing effective remedies to invasive and damaging contractor practices and decisions. To do anything less is true neglect. Allowing the Boeing IDS restructuring, as originally proposed by the contractor, is an example of such neglect.
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